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VI 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether as pleaded in the Complaint, the Butchers' 
claims for breach by Gilroy of an agreement between the parties 
is barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to 
written obligations; 
2. Whether Gilroy's sale of property to R.G.H. Inc. in 
March, 1982 constituted a "payment" under the parties' 
agreement within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 
(1977) . 
STATUTES 
This appeal addresses the district court's application of 
the six-year statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 
(1977) which reads as follows: 
78-12-23. Within six years.--Within six 
years 
(1) An action for the mesne profits of real 
property. 
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation 
or liability founded upon an instrument in 
writing, except those mentioned in the 
preceding section [78-12-22], 
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Reference is also made to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1977) 
which reads as follows: 
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions 
generally.—Civil actions can be commenced 
only within the periods prescribed in this 
chapter, after the cause of action shall 
have accrued, except where in special cases 
a different limitation is prescribed by 
statute. 
The plaintiff-appellants have asserted Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-12-44 (1977) as a basis for avoiding the bar of the 
statute of limitations. That section reads as follows: 
78-12-44 . Payment—Acknowledgement — Promise 
to pay extends period.—In any case founded 
on contract, when any part of the principal 
or interest shall have been paid, or an 
acknowledgment of an existing liability, 
debt or claim, or any promise to pay the 
same, shall have been made, an action may be 
brought within the period prescribed for the 
same after such payment, acknowledgment or 
promise; but such acknowledgment or promise 
must be in writing, signed by the party to 
be charge thereby. When a right of action 
is barred by the provisions of any statute 
it shall be unavailable either as a cause of 
action or ground of defense. 
In addition, the application of Rules 9, 11, and 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to the prosecution of this 
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appeal may prove dispositive. These rules are reproduced as 
Exhibits "E", "F", and "G" of the Addendum. For the 
convenience of this Court, Rules 8, 9 and 12(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, have been included as Exhibits "H", "I" and 
"J" of the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action in which Wendell and Irene Butcher 
("Butchers") sought damages and/or an accounting arising from 
Frank Gilroy's alleged breach of contract, specifically a 
settlement agreement arising out of a prior lawsuit. See 
Settlement Agreement, annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" of the 
Addendum, R. at 37-41. The original Complaint, filed on March 
26, 1984, see R. at 2-11, was the subject of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss raising the bar of the statute of 
limitations. See R. at 16-17. On August 13, 1984, the 
Butchers moved to amend their Complaint, see R. at 22, which 
was stipulated to by counsel and ordered by the Court. See R. 
at 43, 45-46; Amended Complaint, annexed hereto as Exhibit "B" 
of the Addendum, R. at 34-42. On November 19, 1984, R.G.H., 
Inc. filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the ground that 
the Amended Complaint asserted no claim against it, see R. at 
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47, and joined in a similar motion filed that day by Gilroy 
seeking a dismissal grounded upon the statute of limitations. 
See R. at 49, 51-57. A series of memoranda were filed, and the 
District Court, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding, heard 
the motions on February 25, 1985. See R. at 64-66, 67-72, 
74-76, 79. 
On March 13, 1985 the District Court entered orders 
granting both motions to dismiss, true and correct copies of 
which are annexed hereto as Exhibits "C" and "D" of the 
Addendum. See R. at 80-83. 
On April 1, 1985, counsel for the Butchers filed a Notice 
of Appeal with the Clerk of the Third District Court, 
accompanied by two documents, entitled "Docketing Statement" 
and "Designation of Record on Appeal," respectively. See R. at 
84-91. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following statement of facts is derived from the 
Amended Complaint filed in this action, whose factual 
allegations are to be taken as correct for the purposes of the 
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Rule 12(b)(6) motions and this appeal. See e.g., Bryan v. 
Stillwater Board of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1319, 1321 (10th Cir. 
1977). 
1. "On or about October 18, 1971, Wendell L. Butcher, 
Irene B. Butcher, and Frank K. Gilroy stipulated to an entry of 
an order and judgment as Civil No. 179775. As part of the 
stipulation, a settlement agreement attached hereto as Exhibit 
A. was entered into. Frank K. Gilroy was to hold title to 33 
acres surrounding Mt. Dell Golf Course subject to the 
requirement in paragraph 6 that he sell the property by April, 
1976 for the best price attainable and the proceeds be 
apportioned with 32% paid to the [Butchers] and 68% to 
[Gilroy]." Amended Complaint at 1f 4, R. at 34. 
2. "[The Butchers] and Frank K. Gilroy attempted to sell 
the property over the years but because of various subdivision 
development changes and watershed questions, the parties were 
delayed in selling the property." Amended Complaint at 1f 5, R. 
at 34-35. 
3. "On or about March 8, 1982, within six years of the 
performance sale date of April, 1976, Frank K. Gilroy sold the 
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property in question to R.G.H., Inc. without notifying [the 
Butchers] or accounting to them for their share of the 
proceeds." Amended Complaint at 1f 6, R. at 35. 
4. "[The Butchers] continued to attempt to sell the 
property and periodically notified Frank K. Gilroy of their 
progress in this regard. Frank K. Gilroy at no time notified 
plaintiffs that he had sold the property, and continued to 
encourage [the Butchers] in their efforts to find a buyer and 
acquire the necessary building permits from Salt Lake City. 
Based upon Frank K. Gilroy's representation and assurances that 
he was also trying to perform the contract, [the Butchers] 
continued to attempt to sell the property and work with the 
city to obtain permits for the property." Amended Complaint at 
1f 7, R. at 35. 
5. "To date, Frank K. Gilroy has failed to account to 
[the Butchers] or pay them the amounts due and owing under the 
stipulated agreement as was repeatedly promised." Amended 
Complaint at 1f 8, R. at 35. 
6. R.G.H., Inc. and Gilroy dispute the assertion in the 
Butchers' statement of facts that "[t]he settlement agreement 
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required both appellants and respondents to use their best 
efforts to sell the 34 acres and divide the proceeds 
proportionately." Butcher Brief at 2. The "Settlement 
Agreement" attached to the Amended Complaint specifically 
provides that "such sale or disposition shall be conducted by 
Gilroy at a price to be determined by Gilroy in his 
discretion." See "Settlement Agreement" attached to Amended 
Complaint at If 6, R. at 39. Furthermore, the Amended Complaint 
specifically states that Gilroy "was to hold title to 33 acres 
surrounding Mt. Dell Golf Course subject to the requirement in 
paragraph 6 that he sell the property by April 1976 . . . ." 
See Amended Complaint 1f 4, at R. 34. Therefore, neither the 
Amended Complaint nor the "Settlement Agreement" annexed 
thereto reflect the requirement asserted by the brief. See R. 
at 34-42. In addition, the Butchers make no reference to the 
pages of the original record in support of any factual 
assertion in their brief, all in violation of Rule 24(e), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Part V, infra. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Butchers' Amended Complaint pleaded no cause of 
action whatsoever against R.G.H., Inc. Where a complaint seeks 
no relief against a named party defendant, it plainly fails to 
state a claim against that defendant upon which relief may be 
granted. 
2. The settlement agreement at issue between the parties 
is properly treated as an executory accord and its enforcement 
is determined through application of contract law principles. 
The Butchers' claim against Gilroy arises out of his total 
breach of his duty of performance under the parties' agreement, 
which occurred when he failed to sell the property in question 
in April 1976. The Butchers' claim accrued at that time and 
was barred six years later by the statute of limitations. 
3. Nothing about Gilroy's sale of the property to R.G.H., 
Inc. in March, 1982 operates to extend the time in which the 
Butchers could commence their action. Gilroy made no "payment" 
to the Butchers which would toll the statute of limitations 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44; nor did the sale itself come 
within the language of that section. The facts of total breach 
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by Gilroy and the Butchers* knowledge of those facts were 
complete in April of 1976. 
4. Any non-disclosure by Gilroy of the 1982 sale was 
immaterial to the Butchers' prospective action against Gilroy 
for his total breach in 1976. The fact of the ultimate sale 
was not a fact necessary to the Butchers' determination 
following April, 1976 that a cause of action existed. 
5. The correctness of the rulings by the district court 
below should be presumed by this Court as a consequence of the 
Butchers* total failure to support the factual allegations in 
their brief by citation to the record, their failure to file a 
docketing statement in compliance with Rule 9 requirements, 
their failure to follow Rule 11 requirements regarding 
preparation of a transcript, among other rule violations. 
6. The Butchers' argument, raised in their brief, that 
the statute of limitations should be tolled due to Gilroy's 
purported absence from the state, is not supported by any 
well-pleaded facts in their Amended Complaint and is not 
properly before this Court. The allegation finds no support in 
the record. 
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7. The Butchers did not amend their complaint to include 
any allegation of Gilroy's absence from the state either 
following the respondent's first motion to dismiss based upon 
the statute of limitations, or following Judge Rokich's order 
of dismissal, which had allowed them additional leave to 
amend. Their election to appeal rather than to amend waives 
any reliance upon Gilroy's absence as a basis for tolling the 
statute of limitations. It was not properly at issue before 
the court below or this Court on review. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE ORDER GRANTING R.G.H., INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED; THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SETS FORTH NO CLAIM 
AGAINST R.G.H., INC. AT ALL. 
Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that a 
pleading setting forth a claim for relief "shall contain (1) a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the 
relief to which he deems himself entitled." This requirement 
is amplified by Rule 8(e)(1), which demands that "[ejach 
averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct." 
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The Appellants' Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts 
stating any claim for legal or equitable relief against R.G.H., 
Inc. See copy of Amended Complaint annexed hereto as Exhibit 
"B" of the Addendum; R. at 34-42. In fact, the prayer for 
relief makes no mention whatsoever of R.G.H., Inc. See R. 35-36. 
In the most literal and absolute sense, the Amended 
Complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted" against R.G.H., Inc. See Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The District Court's order granting R.G.H.'s 
Motion to Dismiss should be affirmed. 
II. THE ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED; THE BUTCHERS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
A. Settlement Agreement is an Executory Accord Governed 
by Contract Law Principles. 
Recent decisions of this Court have established that "an 
agreement of compromise and settlement in a legal dispute 
constitutes an executory accord." L&A Drywall, Inc. v. 
Whitmore Construction Co.,, 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980) 
(footnote omitted); accord, Cox Construction Co. v. State Road 
Commission., 583 P.2d 85 (Utah 1978). 
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As such, a party to the agreement aggrieved 
by an alleged breach thereof by the other 
party has the option of seeking to enforce 
the settlement agreement, or regarding the 
agreement as rescinded and moving against 
the other party on the underlying claim. 
L&A Drywall, Inc., 608 P.2d at 629 (footnote omitted). In this 
case, the Butchers decisively elected to seek enforcement of 
the Settlement Agreement in an independent proceeding. See 
also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281 (1981). 
As such, the express terms of the Settlement Agreement 
should be construed and enforced as would be the provisions of 
other written contracts. See e.g., Condo v. Mulcahey, 88 
A.D.2d 497, 454 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982); cf. Millerberg v. 
Steadman, 645 P.2d 602 (Utah 1982); Robinson v. Utah State 
Department, of Natural Resources, 620 P.2d 519 (Utah 1980); 
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605 
(Utah 1979). The rules governing contract actions are applied 
to actions for breach of compromise or settlement agreements, 
including such matters as laches or limitations. See 15A C.J.S. 
Compromise & Settlement § 4 9 (19 6 7); see also Annot., 94 
A.L.R.2d 605 (1964). 
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B. The Butchers' Action Arises from Breach of the Terms 
of a Contract and is Barred by the Statute of 
Limitations. 
The applicable statute of limitations provides that an 
action based on a written contract must be commenced within six 
years after the cause of action has accrued. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-12-1; 78-12-23(2) (1977). It is well established that 
the statute of limitations begins to run at the moment a cause 
of action arises and the prospective plaintiff gains the right 
to apply to the courts for remedy. E.g., Fredericksen v. 
Knight Land Corporation, 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1982); State Tax 
Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 181-82, 100 P.2d 575, 
577 (Utah 1940) . 
Likewise, the general rule follows that where the period 
for performance of the contract is fixed, the right of action 
accrues and the statute begins to run at the expiration of that 
period. See, e.g., Howarth v. First National Bank of 
Anchorage, 540 P.2d 486, 490-91 (Alaska 1975) ("[A] cause of 
action for breach of contract accrues as soon as the promisor 
fails to do the thing contracted for, and the statute of 
limitations begins to run at such time.") "A breach of 
contract is a non-performance of any contractual duty of 
- 14 -
immediate performance,M Restatement of Contracts § 312; see 
Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 536 P.2d 729, 735 
(1975). Thus, the six-year limitations period applicable to 
this action began running in April, 1976 when Gilroy failed to 
perform; in April, 1982, that statute became a complete bar to 
this action. 
The obligation of Gilroy to sell the property and 
distribute its proceeds in April, 1976 represented the whole of 
Gilroy*s remaining performance due under the agreement. As 
explained by the Restatement of Contracts § 313(1), " [a] total 
breach of contract is a breach where remedial rights provided 
by law are substituted for all the existing contractual rights, 
or can be so substituted by the injured party." Where the 
"remedial rights provided by law" can be so substituted, the 
cause of action necessarily accrues, triggering the running of 
the applicable limitations period. "A claim for total breach 
is one for damages based on all the injured party's remaining 
rights to performance." Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 236(1) (1981). "[I]t is clear that, whenever the court will 
hold that A's breach is a total breach, B can regard A's 
performance as at an end and at once maintain action for 
damages for all of his injury, past, present and future." 
- 15 -
Corbin on Contracts § 946 at 926 (one vol. ed. 1952); see e.g., 
Riess v. Murchison, 503 F.2d 499, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1974). 
Where one party is in total breach of his contractual 
commitments then remaining, the law neither requires the 
injured party to delay his action until defendant attempts to 
cure the breach, nor tolls the statute of limitations until he 
does. Nothing prevented the Butchers from bringing an action 
against Gilroy when the April 1976 "performance date"—as the 
Complaint terms it — passed without the sale of the property. 
The statute commences operation at the time of the breach, 
i.e., the failure to perform, rather than when actual damages 
are sustained as a consequence. E.g. Howarth, supra, 540 P.2d 
at 490-91. See also 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 125 
(1948) (The statute of limitations begins to run when the 
contract is broken and the amount or kind of damage which a 
plaintiff claims and which may be recoverable by him on the 
breach is immaterial.) Gilroy's failure to perform by April 
1976—not the ultimate sale of the property in 1982—was the 
operative event triggering the running of the limitations 
period. 
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III. GILROY'S SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN MARCH OF 1982 DOES NOT 
EXTEND THE TIME DURING WHICH APPELLANTS MAY PROPERLY BRING 
THIS SUIT. 
The Respondent Gilroy sold the real property which was the 
subject of the Settlement Agreement in March, 1982. That sale, 
made years after Gilroy's total breach of the Settlement 
Agreement, cannot extend the time during which the Butchers may 
rightfully bring suit on the breach of obligations arising from 
that agreement. 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 Does Not Extend Limitations 
Period in this Case. 
The Butchers argued below and in their Brief that Gilroy's 
receipt of payment from R.G.H., Inc. in 1982 constitutes a 
"payment" which operates to toll the statute of limitations 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (1978). That section 
provides: 
—In any case founded on contract, when any 
part of the principal or interest shall have 
been paid, or an acknowledgment of an 
existing liability, debt or claim, or any 
promise to pay the same, shall have been 
made, an action may be brought within the 
period prescribed for the same after such 
payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such 
acknowledgment or promise must be in 
- 17 -
writing, signed by the party to be charged 
thereby. When a right of action is barred 
by the provisions of any statute, it shall 
be unavailable either as a cause of action 
or ground of defense. [Emphasis added.] 
Appellants' reliance on that statute to support their argument, 
however, is inappropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 was originally based upon and is 
similar to a Kansas statute. See Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 Utah 
387, 45 P.2d 565 (1935). In construing their statute, the 
Kansas Supreme Court stated: 
While the language of the statute is that a 
part payment shall operate to toll the 
limitations, it certainly cannot be 
understood to mean that such part payment 
made by any one at any time for any purpose 
would so operate; and it is well recognized 
in the books that such payment must be made 
by the obligor against whom the statute is 
sought to be tolled, or by someone at his 
direction, and made as a part payment of the 
debt, under such circumstances as to amount 
to an acknowledgment of an existing 
liability. 
Good v. Ehrlich, 67 Kan. 94, 72 P. 545, 546 (1903) (emphasis 
added). Quoting Wood on Limitations, § 97, the Court continued: 
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In order to make a money payment a part 
payment within the statute, it must be shown 
to be a payment of a portion of an admitted 
debt, and paid to and accepted by the 
creditor as such, accompanied by 
circumstances amounting to an absolute and 
unqualified acknowledgment of more being 
due, from which a promise may be inferred to 
pay the remainder. 
Id., 72 P. at 546 (emphasis added). 
(In Good v. Erlich, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that 
collection under a promissory note from a third party pledgee 
did not constitute a "payment" for purposes of tolling the 
statute of limitations against the principal debtor.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the approach expressed 
in Good v. Ehrlich in construing Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44. In 
Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 Utah 387, 45 P.2d 565 (1935), the Court, 
in construing a statute identical to Section 78-12-44, stated: 
The great weight of authority is to effect 
that a part payment of either principal or 
interest by one of two or more joint and 
several obligors does not of itself suspend 
the running of the statute of limitations 
against the other co-obligors . . . . The 
reason for this rule is that joint and 
several or joint obligors are not 
necessarily the agent of each other and are 
not authorized to suspend the running of the 
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statute, one as against the other, merely 
because of that relationship; that the 
payment contemplated by the statute as 
tolling its effect must be one made by the 
party himself or by some one authorized by 
him to make it. The reason is well 
illustrated by the following language from 
the case of Marienthal v. Mosler, 16 Ohio 
St. 566, at page 570, in construing a 
statute identical in language to our Section 
104-2-45: "It will be seen, however, that 
the same effect is given to such part 
payment as is given to a written promise 
'signed by the party charged thereby.' It 
would seem, therefore, from analogy, that 
the payment must be made by the party to be 
affected thereby, or by an agent authorized 
for that express purpose. In the 
contemplation of the statute, the part 
payment of a debt is regarded as evidence of 
a willingness and obligation to pay the 
residue, as conclusive as would be a 
personal written promise to that effect. It 
could not, then, have been intended to give 
this effect to payments other than those 
made by the party himself, or under his 
immediate direction. Surely nothing short 
of this would warrant the assumption of a 
willingness to pay equal to his written 
promise to that effect." 
Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 Utah 387, 391-92 45 P.2d 565, 568 
(1935) citation omitted). 
It is evident therefore, that before Section 78-12-44 can 
be applicable to extend a statute of limitations, the following 
conditions must be satisfied: (1) partial payment of either 
principal or interest due under a contract must be made, (2) by 
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the obligor under that contract, and (3) the payment must be 
made to the creditor under that contract. None of these 
conditions has been satisfied in the present case. R.G.H., 
Inc.'s payment to Gilroy arose from the sale of the property to 
Gilroy, not out of the "agreement" between the Butchers and 
Gilroy. 
Had the Respondent Gilroy made some payment in 1982 Jto the 
Butchers, Section 78-12-44 might offer some aid. It is 
impossible, however, to infer from R.G.H., Inc.'s payment to 
Gilroy any renewed promise by Gilroy to pay any amount to the 
Butchers. 
If Section 78-12-44 adds anything to this case, it can only 
add support to the ruling of the court below. To the extent 
that one may read the Amended Complaint to allege that Gilroy 
in some way acknowledged or promised to perform the contract 
following breach through "representations and assurances that 
he was also trying to perform the contract," Amended Complaint 
at 1f 7, R. at 35, the express language of Section 78-12-44 
forbids extension of the time for filing of the Butchers' 
lawsuit. To have such an effect, the new "acknowledgment or 
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promise must be in. writing, signed by the party to be charged 
thereby-M 16. (emphasis added). 
The Butchers have pleaded no written promise or 
acknowledgment signed by Gilroy reestablishing his duty to 
perform under the contract following the April 1976 breach. 
B. Case Law Relied Upon by Appellants Does Not Support 
Extension of the Limitations Period in this Case. 
Both in memorandum below and in their brief on appeal, the 
Butchers rely upon Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 687 P.2d 
34 (Utah 1983), as precedent for maintaining this action. 
Fredericksen, however, is readily distinguishable on its 
facts. In that case, the plaintiff claimed entitlement to a 
share of proceeds from the sale of a number of parcels of land, 
which share was due whenever a parcel was sold. The parties 
set no deadlines or dates for the sale as a specific term of 
their contract. Fredricksen's claims for proceeds simply 
accrued each time another parcel was sold. 
In contrast, the Settlement Agreement in this case 
expressly set an 18-month (April, 1976) deadline for Gilroy to 
sell the property and distribute proceeds. Unlike the 
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Fredericksen transactions, which were divisible into separate 
breaches accruing upon sale of each parcel, Gilroy was 
contractually bound to sell only one parcel. His failure to do 
so by April, 1976 was a total breach of the Agreement. The 
Butchers' cause of action arose at that time. 
As this Court observed in Fredericksen: 
The statute of limitations begins to run at 
the moment that a cause of action arises. 
See, e.g., Ash v. State, Utah 572 P.2d 1374 
(1977); Kimball v. McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 
259 P. 313 (1927). 'Ordinarily, a cause of 
action for a debt begins to run when the 
debt is due and payable because at that time 
an action can be maintained to enforce it.' 
O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355, 357, 463 
P.2d 799, 800 (1970) (quoting State Tax 
Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 
182, 100 P.2d 525, 577 (1940). See also 
M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety 
Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998 (1972) (stating 
that in a breach of contract action the 
statute of limitations ordinarily begins to 
run when the breach occurs). 
Id., 667 P.2d at 36. Breach of the contract in this case was 
complete when April, 1976 passed without sale of the property. 
Gilroy was at that time obligated to sell and distribute a 
share of the proceeds from that sale to the Butchers. At that 
moment, Gilroy became liable to the Butchers for breach of 
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contract and, according to Fredericksen, the statute of 
limitations commenced to run. 
The Butchers cannot now prevail simply by reading the 
material terms out of the contract. 
The limitations period with respect to Gilroy's breach of 
the agreement expired in April of 1982. The Butchers did not 
commence their action until March of 1984, almost two full 
years after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. 
Neither the sale of the Property to R.G.H., Inc. in March of 
1982 nor Gilroy's receipt of payment for the Property tolled or 
otherwise extended the statute of limitations for an action 
from Gilroy's alleged April, 1976 breach, as the Court below 
correctly ruled. 
IV. GILROY'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY BUTCHERS OF THE 1982 
SALE DOES NOT PROVIDE BASIS FOR ESTOPPEL OR EQUITABLE 
TOLLING OF LIMITATIONS STATUTE. 
Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Gilroy was 
required to sell the property by April, 1976 and deliver 32% of 
the proceeds to the Butchers. When the property was not sold 
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in April, 1976, both the Butchers and Gilroy had actual and 
complete knowledge that the agreement had been breached. 
The Butchers' Amended Complaint does not allege facts 
sufficient to support any equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitations, or estoppel of Gilroy or R.G.H. to raise that 
defense. As set forth in Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 
(Utah 1981), "the general rule is that a cause of action 
accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action." _Id. , 635 P.2d at 86 (footnote 
omitted). Accord, Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600, 608 (10th 
Cir. 1983). In a contract action, the cause of action accrues 
upon breach of the contract. 
Utah law recognizes three exceptions to this general rule 
under which the running of the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run when the cause of action normally "accrues." 
These exceptions are found where: 
1. Commencement of the limitations period is 
postponed by legislation; 
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2. Exceptional circumstances make application of the 
general rule irrational or unjust; or 
3. The defendant has concealed or misrepresented one 
or more facts necessary to a determination that a cause of 
action exists. 
Myers, 635 P.2d at 86. 
None of these exceptions apply to this case. The Butchers 
knew of the breach of contract by Gilroy at and after the time 
of the breach in April, 1976. Although the Butchers allege 
that Gilroy concealed the fact that the property had been sold 
in 1982, this fact was not necessary to a determination by the 
Butchers that a cause of action against Gilroy existed 
beginning in April of 1976 for breach of the Settlement 
Agreement. Every fact needed to plead that cause of action was 
known to the Butchers from and after that time. 
This case is easily distinguished from cases such as 
Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978), in 
which plaintiffs did not know the cause of damage to their 
property caused by seeping water and relied on a county 
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official's knowingly false representation that a county storm 
drain was not leaking into their property. Nowhere does the 
Complaint allege that Gilroy made repeated promises to the 
Butchers, that they would in fact be paid, as did the insurance 
agent in Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 26-28, 
456 P.2d 159, 163 (1969). 
The Butchers' naked assertion in the brief that 
"respondents repeatedly promised to try to sell the property to 
prevent appellant from suing," Butcher Brief at 4, finds no 
support either in the allegations of the Amended Complaint, see 
R. at 34-35, or in any competent evidence in the record. No 
citation to the record is made by the Butchers, leaving this 
Court properly to assume the correctness of the court's ruling 
below. See Part V, infra. 
V. APPELLANTS HAVE REPEATEDLY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN THE ATTEMPTED PROSECUTION 
OF THIS APPEAL. 
From the outset, the Butchers' prosecution of this appeal 
has been marred by their repeated failure to comply with the 
requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. While 
some of the violations of the rules appear technical in nature, 
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others are of material importance and prejudicial effect- The 
cumulative effect of the Butchers* delinquencies frustrates and 
impairs the appeal process as envisioned by the new Rules, all 
to the prejudice of respondents Gilroy and R.G.H., Inc. 
A. RULE 6: The Butchers Failed to File a Legally 
Sufficient Bond for Costs on Appeal. 
Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires 
that each appellant "shall file with such notice [of appeal] a 
bond for costs on appeal . . . The bond shall be in the sum of 
at least $300.00, or such greater amount as the district court 
may order . . . " At the time that the Butchers' notice of 
appeal was filed, counsel tendered to the clerk the amount of 
only $100.00, which was transmitted to this Court. See R. at 
92. The Butchers have filed no affidavit of impecuniosity 
excusing them from compliance with Rule 6. 
B. RULE 9: The Butchers Failed to File a Docketing 
Statement With This Court; The Docketing Statement 
Served on Respondents Lacked Required Content. 
Rule 9(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires 
each appellant to file a docketing statement with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court within 21 days of the filing of the notice of 
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appeal, and that "[a]n original and 7 copies shall be filed, 
together with proof of service." The Butchers had not filed a 
docketing statement with this Court as late as July 21, 1985, 
weeks after the deadline had passed. 
A document entitled "Docketing Statement" appears in the 
record below, R. at 84-88, and was served by mail upon Gilroy 
and R.G.H., Inc. on March 29, 1985. Even if deemed to be the 
docketing statement required by Rule 9, its content proves 
materially deficient in several respects: (1) it cites Rule 
72, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as the "authority believed to 
confer jurisdiction" on this Court to hear this appeal, 
notwithstanding the fact that the rule had earlier been 
repealed, see Utah Court Rules Annotated 287 (1985 ed); (2) it 
makes a general conclusory statement of the issue on appeal 
notwithstanding the command of Rule 9(c)(5) that such 
statements are "not acceptable" and that the issue be 
"expressed in terms and circumstances of the case"; and (3) it 
failed to include, as an attachment, a copy of the order of the 
court below granting the joint motion of Gilroy and R.G.H. to 
dismiss, contrary to the requirements of Rule 9(d)(1). 
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The Butchers' failure to comply Rule 9's specific 
requirements both as to content and filing of the docketing 
statement justify the imposition of harsh sections. Rule 9(e) 
expressly provides: 
Consequences of Failure to Comply. 
Docketing statements which fail to comply 
with this Rule will not be accepted. 
Failure to comply may result in dismissal of 
the appeal or petition. 
As the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9 re-emphasizes, 
"Paragraph (e) is explicit that a failure to comply with this 
Rule may result in dismissal fo the appeal." 
C. RULE 11; The Butchers Failed to Comply With 
Requirements Respecting Preparation of Transcript of 
the Proceeding Below. 
Rule 11(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure imposes 
upon each appellant the specific duty to comply with Subparts 
(d) and (e) of that Rule. Rule 11(e) expressly requires the 
appellant to request from the court reporter a transcript of 
"such parts of the proceedings not already on file as he deems 
necessary" within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal. 
"If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, 
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within the same period an appellant shall file a certificate 
to that effect." Rule 11(e)(1), Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure. 
The appellant's duty does not end there. Under Rule 11, 
silence communicates a specific message: "Unless the entire 
transript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 
days after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the 
issues he intends to present on the appeal and shall serve on 
the respondent a copy of the request [for partial transcript] 
or certificate [that no transcript is to be requested] and of 
the statement." Failure to serve such notice communicates the 
message that the appellant will request a transcript of the 
entire proceedings. 
As of July 21, 1985, the Butchers had filed no certificate 
that a transcript would not be requested; nor did they serve 
upon Gilroy or R.G.H., Inc. any statement of intended issues or 
of their intent to order less than an entire transcript. Yet 
it appears from the record that no transcript has been ordered 
at all. 
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The Butchers' complete breach of their duties under Rule 
11(e) works directly to the prejudice of Gilroy and R.G.H., 
Inc. For example, the respondents are unable to refer this 
Court directly to points in the hearing record below wherein 
they objected to the Butchers' assertion of facts extrinsic to 
the Amended Complaint in opposing the respondents' motions to 
dismiss. 
Under former Rule 75(a)(1), an appellant's failure to 
comply with requirements regarding certificates as to 
transcripts warranted dismissal of the appeal. A similar 
sanction may prove useful in enforcement of the new Rule. 
D. RULE 24: The Contents of the Butchers' Brief Fail to 
Comply With Requirements of Rule 24(a), (d), (e), and 
in. 
In terms of the requirements of Rule 24, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure with respect to the content of briefs, the 
Butchers' brief proves deficient in several respects: (1) it 
does not set out in verbatim fashion the statutes that the 
Butchers deem to be determinative [Rule 24(a)(5)]; (2) it 
defies the Rule's injunction to "keep to a minimum references 
to parties by such designations as 'appellant' and 
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1
 respondent'.M [Rule 24(d)]; (3) most critically, it wholly 
fails to make reference to paging in the original record as 
prepared pursuant to Rule 11(b). Not a single citation to the 
record appears in the Butchers' brief [Rule 24(e)]; and (4) the 
"Appendix" to the Butchers* brief does not include "[c]opies of 
those parts of the record on appeal that are of central 
importance to the determination of the appeal (e.g. . . . the 
contract or document subject to construction, etc.)," such as 
the Amended Complaint or the Settlement Agreement between the 
Butchers and Gilroy that is the subject of this action. 
(Emphasis added.) [Rule 24(f)]. 
Particularly as to the requirement that citations be made 
to the paginated record on appeal, this Court has steadfastly 
refused to review or consider factual issues not directly 
identified to the record. As stated in Uckerman v. Lincoln 
National Life Insurance Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978), "[t]his 
Court need not, and will not, consider any facts no properly 
cited to, or supported by, the record." I_d. 588 P.2d at 144 
(applying former Rule 75(p)(2)). 
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In State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983), for 
example, this Court observed that: 
With respect to the first three points set 
forth above, the defendant's brief contains 
absolutely no references to the trial record 
or tanscript to support his factual 
allegations. In State v. Tucker, Utah, 657 
P.2d 755 (1982), this Court stated: This 
Court will assume the correctness of the 
judgment below if counsel on appeal does not 
comply with the requirements of Rule 
75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as to making a concise statement 
of facts and citation of the pages in the 
record where they are supported. 
Id., at 757 (citing Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 
121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952)). See 
also, e.g., State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657 
P.2d 289 (1982). In accordance with the 
rule set forth in State v. Tucker, we will 
assume the correctness of the trial court's 
judgment. 
Id. , 660 P.2d at 253 (footnotes ommitted). Even more recent 
in White River Shale Oil Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 
P.2d , 9 U.A.R.9 (Utah, decided May 2, 1985), this 
Court stated: 
Utah Power and Light Co. has provided 
no citations to the record in its brief. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 75 (p)(2)(2)(d)(superceded 
on January I, 1985, by Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24(e) and 24(K)) 
requires that, on appeal, the party must 
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make a concise statement of facts and 
citation of the pages in the record where 
those facts are supported. Failing that, 
this Court will assume the correctness of 
the judgment below. State v. Steggell, 
Utah, 660 P.2d 252 (1983) . . . 
Id. 9 U.A.R. at 12 n.1. 
Nothing in the text of new Rule 24(e) counsels any 
departure from this Court's prior approach, particularly in 
cases where the appellant makes no effort to raise his factual 
assertions through direct citations to the record as prepared 
and indexed under the Rules. 
In this case, this Court should assume the correctness of 
the district court's rulings, particularly in relation to the 
Butchers' assertions in their brief of extrinsic facts 
concerning Gilroy's purported concealment of the 1982 sale or 
his alleged absence from the jurisdiction at times relevant to 
the statute of limitations. 
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VI. THE BUTCHERS' ALLEGATIONS THAT GILROY WAS ABSENT FROM THE 
STATE ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
At pages 4-5 of the Butchers' Brief, it is argued that: 
[tjhere is also a question of fact as to 
whether the Gilroys, who maintain a Nevada 
residence, were absent from the state to 
prevent the tolling of the statute. 
Respondents extended stays in Nevada would 
delay the tolling of the statute of 
limitations, until their return under 
Section 78-12-35, U.C.A., 1953 as amended; 
see Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915, 15 U.2d. 
54 (1964). 
Even assuming that the Butchers meant to say that Gilroy's 
purported absence prevents the running of the statute of 
limitations period rather than its tolling, see Black's Law 
Dictionary 1334 (5th ed. 1979), once again the argument is 
devoid of citations to the record. See Part V, supra. 
Furthermore, nothing in the Amended Complaint offers any 
support for the Butchers' argument; paragraphs 2 and 3 allege 
simply tht "Frank K. Gilroy is a resident of the state of Utah 
and that "R.G.H., Inc. is a Utah corporation." R. at 34. The 
factual basis for the district court's rulings is confined to 
those allegations found within the four corners of the Amended 
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Complaint. E.g., Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639-40 
(2d Cir. 1980). The court below made no determination to 
convert the respondents* motions into motions for summary 
judgment under Rule 56 -- the only way that facts extrinsic to 
the pleadings could have been considered under Rule 
12(b)(6)--and no opportunity was given Gilroy or R.G.H., to 
present additional pertinent material as would be required if 
the motion was to be so converted. See Bekins Bar V Ranch v. 
Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n, 587 P.2d 151, 152 (Utah 1978); 
Strand v. Associated Students, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977). 
Even in the court below the matter was not proffered by 
affidavit or competent evidence; there, as here, counsel 
asserted the matter as part of a legal argument, see R. at 75, 
in a document entitled "Supplemental Reply Memorandum,"—one 
not provided for in the Third District Court's Supplementary 
Rules of Practice. See id., Rule 2(i). 
Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2 of the Int'l Ass'n of Mach. & 
Aero. Workers, 452 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1971), cert, denied 
406 U.S. 946 (1972)(Points and authorities do not constitute 
matters outside the pleading sufficient to transform a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment); Byron v. 
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University of Florida, 403 F.Supp. 49, 53 (N.D.Fla. 1975)(If a 
party wants the court to look to an extrinsic matter, he must 
put that information in proper evidentiary form); See also 
North Star International v. Arizona Corp. Commission, 720 F.2d 
578, 582 (9th Cir. 1983). ("[I]t becomes apparent that a 
motion to dismiss is not automatically converted into a motion 
for summary judgment whenever matters outside the pleading 
happen to be filed with the Court and not expressly rejected by 
the Court.") 
Rule 9(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly 
provides that M[f]or the purpose of testing the sufficiency of 
a pleading, averments of time and place are material and shall 
be considered like all other averments of material matter." 
Where a plaintiff by the allegations of his complaint erects 
the bar of the statute of limitatons, a motion to dismiss 
should be granted unless the plaintiff has also pleaded any 
exception upon which he relies. See e.g., Kincheloe v. Farmer, 
214 F.2d 604, 605 (7th Cir. 1954), cert, denied 348 U.S. 920 
(1955); Kaiser Aluminum v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. 677 F.2d 
1045 (5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); 
Jablons v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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VIII. THE BUTCHERS' ELECTION TO APPEAL RATHER THAN TO AMEND 
THEIR COMPLAINT OPERATES AS A WAIVER OF ANY RELIANCE ON 
GILROY'S PURPORTED ABSENCE. 
It must be remembered that the Butchers were put on notice 
of the statute of limitations defense by the first motion to 
dismiss. See R. at 16-17. They chose not to plead Gilroy's 
alleged absence from the state as an exception to that defense 
in their Amended Complaint. 
Furthermore, the Butchers declined the opportunity to 
further amend their complaint pursuant to Judge Rokich's order 
see R. at 83, choosing instead to appeal from that order. They 
in effect chose to stand on their original Amended Complaint 
and relinquished the argument they would now assert. Accord, 
Mitchell v. Archibald & Kendall, Inc., 573 F.2d 429, 432-33 
(7th Cir. 1978)(applying Federal Rule 12 (b)(6)). That 
argument therefore can play no part in the testing of that 
pleading's sufficiency. 
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CONCLUSION 
In applying the statutes of limitations, this Court has 
In determining the question here presented, 
due regard must be given to the purpose and 
object of the statute. The law is wise and 
beneficial, and its objects sought not to be 
defeated by interpretation. It is entitled 
to the same respect as other statutes, and 
ought to be enforced, not only on the 
presumption, arising from lapse of time, 
that the debt has been paid, but because it 
is essentially a statute of repose. It 
affords protection against ancient demands, 
whether originally well founde3d or not, and 
serves as a warning against the consequences 
of laches . . . . The statute has a 
tendency to prevent oppressive charges, 
which might be made, almost with impunity, 
after a distance of time when the 
transaction has faded from memory, or the 
evidence has been lost, and to produce 
speedier adjustment of accounts and affairs. 
See Kuhn v. Mount, 13 Utah 108, 44 P. 1036, 1037-38 
(1896)(emphasis added). As so aptly summarized by the Butchers 
themselves in their brief on appeal: 
An action based upon a written contract must 
be commenced within six years after the 
cause of action occurred; see Section 
78-12-1, Section 78-12-[23](2), U.C.A., 
1953, as amended. Thus, the cause of action 
- 40 -
had to be initiated on or before April, 1982 
(six years after the date of last 
performance on April, 1976), unless 
respondents engaged in some type of conduct 
to extend the statutory period. 
Appellants* Brief at 3. As explained above, the Butchers' 
Amended Complaint aleeges no claim against R.G.H., Inc. 
whatsoever. The allegations against Gilroy relating to conduct 
extending the period are either insufficient as a matter of law 
or are not properly before either this Court or the court below, 
Both of the orders dismissing the Butchers' Amended 
Complaint should be affirmed. 
DATED: July 25, 1985. 
CALLISTER & MEBEKER 
James R. Holbrook 
Steven E. Tyler 
Russell C. Kearl 
By 
r
^r^^-c_yJji 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Frank K. Gilroy and R.G.H., 
Inc. 
GCN0389K 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
It is hereby certified by the undersigned that four (4) 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS FRANK K. GILROY 
AND R.G.H., INC. were served by mail, postage fully prepaid, 
upon counsel for the appellants: 
Marcus G. Theodore 
Suite 701 - Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
on this 25th day of July, 1985, 
CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
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A D D E N D U M 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this day of 
October, 1971, by and between Wendell L. Butcher, hereinafter 
referred to as "Butcher" and Frank K. Gilroy, hereinafter referred 
to as "Gilroy". 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, the above named parties are presently involved in 
litigation in the Third Judicial District Court in Case No, 179775, 
entitled "Frank K. Gilroy, Plaintiff, vs. Peter M. Lowe, et al., 
Defendants"; and 
WHEREAS, both Gilroy and Butcher have claims against each 
other and desire to resolve and settle said claims prior to the 
final judgment of the Court trying this matter. 
NOV*1, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and of 
the mutual promises of the parties contained herein, the parties 
agree as follows : 
1. Gilroy will pay to Butcher the sum of $3S,000 cash, pay-
able within five (5) days of the date of this Agreement. 
2. Butcher hereby acknowledges that the foregoing sum is 
received as complete satisfaction of his claim against Frank K. 
Gilroy for damages, and hereby waives all claim and interest in and 
to the property knovrn as Mountain Dell Estates, which is the subject 
matter of the above mentioned litigation. It is recognized that 
Butchers have heretofore elected to abandon any rights under the 
contract dated July 26, 1963, relative to the Mountain Dell properties, 
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and shall stipulate that a declaratory judgment may be entered-trhat 
they have no interest therein. Butchers shall further stipulate 
the.! the pending Counterclaim by Butchers against Gilroy shall be 
dicTusser with prejudice. Butcher shall quit claim to Gilroy any 
and all right, title or interest he may have or claim in and to 
the Mountain Dell properties, and the so-called Fisher and Wand 
properties. Butchers and Gilroy shall provide to each other recipro-
cal General Releases of all claims or liabilities to date. 
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3. Butcher agrees to obtain approval from the appropriate 
county and state authorities foi permission to subdivide the Mountain 
Dell property and shall be entitled to a period of 36 months from 
the date of this Agreement to obtain such approval. Gilroy agrees 
to execute such documents as owner of the properties as may be 
required in order to obtain such approval, provided, however, that 
Gilroy shall not be required to expend any funds in connection with 
the effort tc obtain said subdivision approval and all costs in con-
nection therewith will be Butcher's expense. It is understood that 
subdivision approval and all development work and expense in order 
to obtain approval of a contemplated subdivision of the Mountain Dell 
properties shall be the responsibility and at the sole expense of 
Butchei . Gilroy shall have no responsibility whatsoever in subdivi-
sion approval, or any developmental work and expense in connection 
therewith, 01 any subsequent developmental work and expense of any 
kind or nature- whatsoever. Subdivision approval shall mean absolute 
approval of the subdivision, including approvals of going forth abso-
lutely for the sale of lots, including but not limited to Health 
Department approvals, Uctei Department approvals, Zoning Department 
approvals, State Highway approvals, approvals of all governmental 
agencies and clearances oi any kind or natuie whatsoever in ordei to 
go forward and sell lots without any restrictions of any kind. 
14. Buichejr agrees tc employ the fire of Coon. King & Knowlton 
or some other conpetent engineering firm mutually agreed upon to assist 
him in obtaining the approval of the subdividing of the Mountain Dell 
Estate pioperties and to pay all costs in connection therewith and 
in addition any legal 02 othei e>>pences necessary to obtain such 
approval. Baichei agrees to follow the recomnendations of such 
engineers in obtaining SLJC>, subdivision approval, and it is under-
stood that if tie s'-bdi\_sicn appio\al is not cbtrined by reason of 
Butcher's failure to follow the reconnendations of the engineering 
firm employed to assist in obtFining subdi\ision anpioval his recovery 
from the sale or disposition of the property as hereinafter provided 
s"ball be reduced by 10/s. 
38 
EXHIBIT A 
Page 2 of -5 
5. In the event the subdivision is approved within 36 
months from the date of this Agreement, the first proceeds from 
the sale of lots shall be paid to Gilroy until Gilroy has received 
the sum of $86,565.58, together with interest thereon from the date 
of this Agreement to the date of payment calculated at a rate of 8% 
per annum. Provided, that in the event Gilroy is required to pay 
interest on the $35,000 paid to Butcher in connection with this 
settlement agreement, Butcher will pay such additional interest 
rate, but not more than a total rate of 9% per annum as to the 
$35,000. "First proceeds" shall mean the net proceeds from the 
sale of each lot, less escrow fees and expenses of sale. 
6. In the event butcher is unable to obtain subdivision 
approval within 36 months frorr the date of this Agreement, then, and 
in that event, the Mountain Dell Estares property shall be sold or 
disposer of for the best price obtainable, and from the proceeds of 
such sale Gilroy and Butcher will receive a proportionate share based 
upon the investment of Gilroy in the property of $86,565.58 and the 
investment of Butcher in the property of $40,877.43. The sale or dis-
position shall be conducted within 18 months immediately following 
the expiration of the 36 month period set forth in paragraph 3 herein, 
and such sale or disposition shall be conducted by Gilroy at a price 
to be determined" by Gilroy in his own discretion. 
7. It is understood that Gilro\ or his designated attorney 
in fact will execute all documents reasonably necessary in order to 
obtain subdivision approval, including but not limited to the Petition 
for Subdivision Approval, the application to the State of Utah for 
p_rr.iiss.ion to sell subcivioec lands and any other petitions, documents 
and/or &g» i ennis \ ith the r.jr.icipalit\ of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
Count\. State of Utah, and/or an\ Subdivisions thereof, provided, 
however, in all such documents there shall be a disclosure of the 
fact that Gilroy has not undertaken any responsibility or liability 
in connection with the approval of the subdivision or any develop-
mental v?ork of any kind or nature whatsoever. 
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8. In the event at any time Gilroy is not satisfied with 
the progress being made in connection with the effort to obtain sub-
division approval, he shall have the right and option, at his own 
expense, to provide additional legal or engineering assistance, but 
such assistance will not be chargeable against Butcher *s ultimate 
recovery from the sale of the property if the subdivision approval 
is not obtained or from the sale of lots if the subdivision approval 
is obtained. In no event shall the providing of such legal or engi-
neering assistance be construed to obligate Gilroy to perform any 
of the subdivision or developmental responsibilities herein, nor 
excuse Butcher therefrom. 
9. Butcher hereby agrees to defend Gilroy from any claim, 
lien or assertion of judgment or other rights as against the Mountain 
Dell property or as against Gilroy relative to the Mountain Dell 
property, provided, however, that Butcher shall have 'no liability 
therewith except to provide and pay for such defense. 
10. It is agreed that Gilroy shall be provided with a copy 
of all documents, correspondence or writings which shall be sent or 
received in connection with attempts to gain subdivision approval, 
developmental work and any other matter inconnection with the Mountain 
Dell properties. Upon request not more often than each six months, 
Gilroy shall receive a written status, report and shall have the right 
to examine Eutcher's expense record? as to the Mountain Dell property 
at any reasonable time. 
11. Butcher agrees not to represent or hold out to any 
public official, creditor or any other person that Gilroy is a partner, 
joint venturer, or stands in a principal-agent relationship with 
Butcherc Vfnenever GilroyTs name shall appear in all such documents 
there shall be a disclosure of the fa ex that Gilroy has not under-
taken any responsibility or liability in connection with the approval 
of the subdivision or any developmental work of any kind or nature 
whatsoever. 
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12. Butchers herewith waive and abandon any and all claims 
as against Gilroy by reason of that certain agreement dated July 26, 
1963, between Marlowe Investment Company as Seller and Butchers as 
Buyer, and herewith acknowledge that they will assert no claim of 
any kind or nature by reason of any acts which at any time have been 
occurred by Marlowe Investment Company, or Peter M. Lowe or by reason 
of that certain agreement between Gilroy and Lowe dated February 3, 
1963. Butchers, however, reserve all rights and claims against the 
defendants Lowe and Marlowe. 
13. An escrow arrangement is contemplated in connection with 
this transaction, and the parties agree to pay escrow fees 50% by 
each party* The escrow instructions shall provide for a release of 
lots upon peyment to Gilroy of the net proceeds of sales thereof, with 
the provision that in no event shall there be any release of lots with-
out payment to Gilroy of the net proceeds in each instance. Any 
property taxes and assessments paid by Gilroy shall be repaid to 
Gilroy and shall be added to GilroyTs interest in the proceeds payable 
hereunder. Upon payment of the full balance due to Gilroy, plus 
interest, the escrow shall be closed and Gilroy shall convey his 
remaining right, title and interest in and to the property to Butcher. 
In the event that Gilroy has not been paid all sums due within 12 
months after subdivision approval, the escrow agent shall be instructed 
to list the properties for sale over the multiple listing bureau of 
the Salt Lake Real Estate Board, at appraisal value. 
14. Butchers7 rights shall be determined entirely by reason 
of this contract, and no other or further agreements exist. Any 
modifications of the foregoing agreement shall be in writing signed 
by the parties. 
15. It is understood that both parties to this Agreement 
are reserving all rights which they have or believe they have against 
the defendants Peter M. Lowe, Martha Lowe and Marlowe Investment 
Company. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto subscribed 
their names the day and year first above written. 
rr.NTCiLJ. L. l^ iCrili H. ~!~~GTf.-70V" EXHIBIT A 
Marcus G. Theodore 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Valley Tower, Suite 701 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-8622 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL L. BUTCHER and IRENE B. 
BUTCHER, 
: AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs, : 
s Civil No. C84-1826 
vs. : 
: Judge Leary 
FRANK K. GILROY, and R.G.H. : 
INC., a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants, : 
COME NOW Wendell L. Butcher and Irene B. Butcher and 
allege as follows: 
1. Wendell L. Butcher and Irene B. Butcher are residents 
of the State of Utah. 
2. Frank K. Gilroy is a resident of the State of Utah. 
3. R.G.H., Inc. is a Utah corporation. 
4. On or about October 18, 1971, Wendell L. Butcher, 
Irene B. Butcher, and Frank K. Gilroy stipulated to an entry 
of an order and judgment as Civil No. 179775. As part of the 
stipulation, a settlement agreement attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
was entered into. Frank K. Gilroy was to hold title to 33 acres 
surrounding Mt. Dell Golf Course subject to the requirement 
in paragraph 6 that he sell the property by April, 1976 for the 
best price attainable and the proceeds be apportioned with 
32% paid to the plaintiffs and 68% paid to the defendant. 
5. Plaintiffs and Frank K. Gilroy attempted to sell the 
property over the years but because of various subdivision 
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development changes and watershed questions, the parties were 
delayed in selling the property. 
6. On or about March 8, 1982, within six years of the 
performance sale date of April, 1976, Frank K. Gilroy sold the 
property in question to R.G.H., Inc. without notifying 
plaintiffs or accounting to them for their share of the proceeds. 
A copy of the warranty deed is attached hereto as Exhibit B., 
and by this reference incorporated herein. 
7. Plaintiffs continued to attempt to sell the property 
and periodically notified Frank K. Gilroy of their progress in 
this regard. Frank K. Gilroy at no time notified plaintiffs 
that he had sold the property, and continued to encourage 
plaintiffs in their efforts to find a buyer and acquire the 
necessary building permits from Salt Lake City. Based upon 
Frank K. Gilroyfs representation and assurances that he was also 
trying to perform the contract, plaintiffs continued to attempt 
to sell the property and work with the city to obtain permits 
for the property. 
8. To date, Frank K. Gilroy has failed to account to 
plaintiffs or pay them the amounts due and owing under the 
stipulated agreement as was repeatedly promised. 
9. Plaintiffs therefore request the court to require Frank 
K. Gilroy to account for all moneys received and to apportion the 
same between the parties under the terms of the stipulated agreement. 
In the event Frank K. Gilroy failed to acquire fair market value 
for the property, for a judgment against him in the amount of any 
deficiency. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows: 
1. For the court to require Frank K. Gilroy to account to 
plaintiffs for all sums received from the sale of the property. 
2. For judgment to be entered against Frank K. Gilroy 
for the amounts due and owing plaintiffs under the stipulated 
agreement. 
3. For such other and further relief as the court may 
-2-
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deem just and equitable under the premises, 
DATED this Jof^day of August, 1984. 
20D0RE MARCUS G. THEODC 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Address of Plaintiffs: 
3980 Eldorado Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Amended Complaint was mailed first class postage 
prepaid this 16th day of October, 1984 to Steven E. Tyler, 
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hansen, 175 South West Temple, 
#700, Salt Lake City, UT 84101. 
(vl/JU> mudx* 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this day of 
October, 1971, by and between Wendell L. Butcher, hereinafter 
referred to as "Butcher" and Frank K. Gilroy, hereinafter referred 
to as "Gilroy". 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, the above named parties are presently involved in 
litigation in the Third Judicial District Court in Case No. 179775, 
entitled "Frank K. Gilroy, Plaintiff, vs. Peter M. Lowe, et al., 
Defendants"; and 
WHEREAS, both Gilroy and Butcher have claims against each 
other and desire to resolve and settle said claims prior to the 
final judgment of the Court trying this matter. 
NOV', THEREFOrX, in consideration of the foregoing and of 
the mutual promises of the parties contained herein, the parties 
agree as f ollov.'S: 
1. Gilroy will pay to Butcher the sum of $35,000 cash, pay-
able within five (S) days of the date of this Agreement. 
2. Butcher hereby acknowledges that the foregoing sum is 
received as complete satisfaction of his claim against Frank K. 
Gilroy for damages, and hereby waives all claim and interest in and 
to the property knovrn as Mountain Dell Estates, which is the subject 
matter of the above mentioned litigation. It is recognized that 
Butchers have heretofore elected to abandon any rights under the 
contract dated July 26, 1963, relative to the Mountain Dell properties, 
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and shell stipulate that a declaratory judgment may be entered-i:hat 
they have no interest therein. Butchers shall further stipulate 
that the pending Counterclaim by Butchers against Gilroy shall be 
dismissed with prejudice. Butcher shall quit claim to Gilroy any 
and all right, title or interest he may have or claim in and to 
the Mountain Dell properties, and the so-called Fisher and Wand 
properties. Butchers and Gilroy shall provide to each other recipro-
cal General Releases of all claims or liabilities to date* 
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3. Butcher agrees to obtain approval from the appropriate 
cejjnty and state authorities for permission to subdivide the Mountain 
Dell property and shall be entitled to a period of 36 months from 
the date of this Agreement to obtain such approval. Gilroy agrees 
to execute such documents as owner of the properties as may be 
required in order to obtain such approval, provided, however, that 
Gilroy shall not be required to expend any funds in connection with 
the effort tc obtain said subdivision approval and all costs in con-
nection therewith will be Butcher's expense. It is understood that 
subdivision approval and all development work and expense in order 
to obtain approval of a contemplated subdivision of the Mountain Dell 
properties shall be the responsibility and at the sole expense of 
Butchei . Gilroy shall have no responsibility whatsoever in subdivi-
sion approval, or any developmental work and expense in connection 
therewith, or any subsequent developmental work and expense of any 
kind or nature- whatsoever. Subdivision approval shall mean absolute 
approval of the subdivision, including approvals of going forth abso-
lutely for the sale of lots, including but not limited to Health 
Department approvals, Water Department approvals, Zoning Department 
approvals, State Highway approvals-, approvals of all governmental 
agencies and clearances of any kind or nature whatsoever in order to 
go forward and sell lots without any restrictions of any kind. 
M. Butcher agrees TC employ the firm of Coon, King & Knowlton 
or some other corripetent engineering firm mutually agreed upon to assist 
him in obtaining the approval of the subdividing of the Mountain Dell 
Estate properties and to pay all costs in connection therewith and 
in addition any legal or other expenses necessary to obtain such 
approval. Butcher agrees to follow the recommendations of such 
engineers in obtaining such subdivision approval, and it is under-
stood that if the subdivision approval is not obtained by reason of 
Butcher's failure to follow the recommendations of the engineering 
firm employed to assist in obtaining subdivision approval his recovery 
from the sale or disposition of the property as hereinafter provided 
s"hall "be reduced by 10?o« 
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5. In the event the subdivision is approved within 36 
months from the date of this Agreement, the first proceeds from 
the sale of lots shall be paid to Gilroy until Gilroy has received 
the sum of $86,565.58, together with interest thereon from the date 
of this Agreement to the date of payment calculated at a rate of 8% 
per annum. Provided, that in the event Gilroy is required to pay 
interest on the $35,000 paid to Butcher in connection with this 
settlement agreement, Butcher will pay such additional interest 
rate, but not more than a total rate of 9% per annum as to the 
$35,000. "First proceeds" shall mean the net proceeds from the 
sale of each lot, less escrow fees and expenses of sale. 
6. In the event Butcher is unable to obtain subdivision 
approval within 36 months from the date of this Agreement, then, and 
in that event, the Mountain Dell Estates property shall be sold or 
disposed of for the best price obtainable, and from the proceeds of 
such sale Gilroy and Butcher will receive a proportionate share based 
upon the investment of Gilroy in the property of $86,565.58 and the 
investment of Butcher in the property of $40,877.M3. The sale or dis-
position shall be conducted within 18 months immediately following 
the expiration of the 36 month period set forth in paragraph 3 herein, 
and such sale or disposition shall be conducted by Gilroy at a price 
to be determined by Gilroy in his own discretion. 
7. It is understood that Gilroy or his designated attorney 
in fact will execute all documents reasonably necessary in order to 
obtain subdivision approval, including but not limited to the Petition 
for Subdivision Approval, the application to the State of Utah for 
permission to sell subdivided lands and any other petitions, documents 
and/or agr-eements with the municipality of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and/or any subdivisions thereof, provided, 
however, in all such documents there shall be a disclosure of the 
fact that Gilroy has not undertaken any responsibility or liability 
in connection with the approval of the subdivision or any develop-
mental -work of any kind or nature whatsoever. 
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B. In the event at any time Gilroy is not satisfied with 
the progress being made in connection with the effort to obtain sub-
division approval, he shall have the right and option, at his own 
expense, to provide additional legal or engineering assistance, but 
such assistance will not be chargeable against Butcher's ultimate 
recovery from the sale of the property if the subdivision approval 
is not obtained or from the sale of lots if the subdivision approval 
is obtained. In no event shall the providing of such legal or engi-
neering assistance be construed to obligate Gilroy to perforin any 
of the subdivision or developmental responsibilities herein, nor 
excuse Butcher therefrom. 
9. Butcher hereby agrees to defend Gilroy from any claim, 
lien or assertion of judgment or other rights as against the Mountain 
Dell property or as against Gilroy relative to the Mountain Dell 
property, provided, however, that Butcher shall have no liability 
therewith except to provide and pay for such defense. 
10. It is agreed that Gilroy shall be provided with a copy 
of all documents, correspondence or writings which shall be sent or 
received in connection with attempts to gain subdivision approval, 
developmental work and any other matter inconnection with the Mountain 
Dell properties. Upon request not more often than each six months, 
Gilroy shall receive a written status report and shall have the right 
to examine Butcher's expense records as to the Mountain Dell property 
at any reasonable time. 
11. Butcher agrees not to represent or hold out to any 
public official, creditor or any other person that Gilroy is a partner, 
joint venturer, or stands in a principal-agent relationship with 
Butcher. Whenever Gilroy1s name shall appear in all such documents 
there shall be a disclosure of the j£:ct that Gilroy has not under-
taken any responsibility or liability in connection with the approval 
of the subdivision or any developmental work of any kind or nature 
whatsoever. 
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12. Butchers herewith waive and abandon any and all claims 
as against Gilroy by reason of that certain agreement dated July 26, 
1963, between Marlowe Investment Company as Seller and Butchers as 
Buyer, and herewith acknowledge that they will assert no claim of 
any kind or nature by reason of any acts which at: any time have been 
occurred by Marlowe Investment Company, or Peter M. Lowe or by reason 
of that certain agreement between Gilroy and Lowe dated February 3, 
1963. Butchers, however, reserve all rights and claims against the 
defendants Lowe and Marlowe. 
13. An escrow arrangement is contemplated in connection with 
this transaction, and the parties agree to pay escrow fees 50% by 
each partyc The escrow instructions shall provide for a release of 
lots upon peyment to Gilioy of the net proceeds of sales thereof, with 
the provision that in no event shall there be any release of lots with-
out payment to Gilroy of the net proceeds in each instance. Any 
property taxes and assessments paid by Gilroy shall be repaid to 
Gilroy and shall be added tc Gilroy1s interest in the proceeds payable 
hereunder* Upon payment of the full balance due to Gilroy, plus 
interest, the escrow shall be closed and Gilroy shall convey his 
remaining right, title and interest in and to the property to Butcher. 
In the event that Gilroy has not been paid all sums due within 12 
months after subdivision approval, the escrow agent shall be instructed 
to list the properties for sale ovei the multiple listing bureau of 
the Salt Lake Real Estate Board, at appraisal value. 
14. Butchers1 rights shall be determined entirely by reason 
of this contract, and no other or further agreements exist. Any 
modifications of the foregoing agreement shall be in writing signed 
by the parties. 
15. It is understood that both pdrties to this Agreement 
are reserving all rights which they have or believe they have against 
the defendants Peter M. Lowe, Martha Lowe and Marlowe Investment 
Company. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto subscribed 
their names the cay and year first above written. 
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Hscordtdst of Hoyle k Draper 6flQ Dcjgnt Plain. S.L.C. fit. J U l l i 
S t . . 
inr-
.M. FssPssJl- ! ! 
D*> JULx. 
Maili 
3657636 
3601 Astra S i m l a , s.Ti.r., qtj 
t410t 
WARRANTY DEED 
(SfMdsl) 
FRAMK I . GILROY 
of Las Vegas He\ada 
Cowrrr a m w'aasAar *7. 
fp R.G.H., IMC*
 f 
3604 Astro Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Otah 
Ten and No/100 • •  • — — ••• • •„-..,, •• •. • •• • ->«• 
and other good and valuable consideration 
the following omcriboi tact ellssd m Salt Lake 
i i Scat* of Utah: 
i I 
smmef 
noiiAis, 
Coenrjr, 
The Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 
11, Township 1 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
EXCEPTING such documents as may refer to the rights of way 
of Salt Lake and Eastern Railroad, Utah Central Railroad, 
Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Companies, Knight Power 
Company, -the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
and Salt Lake County, but which do not definitely locate said 
rights of way in connection with said property. 
Sibject to all current taxes, easements, restrictions and 
rights of way of record or enforceable in law or equity. 
WITNESS, tne h a d of mud 
Signed in tmt 
,A.D. If ?X T*t dsyof 
STATE Or UTAH, 
County of Salt Lake 
Oats* Tt£ 
h 
§ TV, 1 * >-* £*=! 
Frank K. Gilroy 
l o o c 
t* 
mm** W 
« 
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GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
JAMES R. HOLBROOK (A-1516) 
STEVEN E. TYLER (A-3301) 
RUSSELL C. KEARL (A-1780) 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 531-7676 
Attorneys for Defendants 
/ l<E0i»i CLeflCS QFFICI 
:^j«iv.!iTAH 
tod 4»r*'|$ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
WENDELL L. BUTCHER and 
IRENE B. BUTCHER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FRANK K. GILROY and R.G.H., 
INC.f a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C 84-1826 
Judge John H. Rokich 
* * * * * * * 
Defendant R.G.H., Inc.'s motion to dismiss came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable John H. Rokich on 
Monday, February 25, 1985 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Marcus G. Theodore and defendant R.G.H., 
was represented by Steven L. Tyler. Based upon defendant's 
motion and the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing 
therefore, 
nwwr c 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the action filed against 
defendant R.G.H., Inc. is hereby dismissed without prejudice 
because the complaint filed herein fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
DATED this /1*~ day of /ty £ n , 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINOLEY 
By C^OJuL 
(L 
- > S 7 — \ f V / ^ 
^ y N ^ ^ J o h i jiy Rokich 
aaZ^lQM^hiJod D i s t r i c t 
^1 I: 
potior** Court Judge 
[! Approved as to Form: 
By ^ ^ y . _ 
"Marcus G. Theodore, 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s 
Steven E. Tyler> 
Attorney for D^  
Date 
Date / Q b , &*!. l<t*S 
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C> ri i GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
JAMES R. HOLBROOK (A-1516) 
STEVEN E. TYLER (A-3301) 
RUSSELL C. KEARL (A-1780) 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 531-7676 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
i£RK 
I! WENDELL L. BUTCHER and 
|; IRENE B. BUTCHER, 
Plaintiffs, 
! v . 
I FRANK K. GILROY and R.G.H., 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants 
ORDER 
Civil No. C 84-1826 
Judge John H. Rokich 
* * * * * * * 
The motion of defendants Frank K. Gilroy and R.G.K., 
jl Inc., to dismiss the above-titled action for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted by reason that all 
claims made therein are barred by the appropriate statute of 
limitations, came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
John H. Rokich on Monday, February 25, 1985 at 10:00 o'clock 
a.m. Plaintiffs were represented by Marcus G. Theodore and 
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defendants were represented by Steven E. Tyler. Based upon the 
arguments of counsel and the Court's review of the memoranda 
filed herein, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. All claims alleged in the plaintiffs1 First Amended 
Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice because they are 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Utah Code 
Ann., Section 78-12-23 (Repl. 1977). 
2. In the event that plaintiffs have not filed an Amended 
Complaint stating a claim against defendants which is not barred 
by the statute of limitations on or before March 11, 1985, this 
action is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED THIS /'JL day of Alair^Uw , 1985. 
ATTEST 
H DJXON-WJNDLEY 
Oeputy Gleric 
Approved a s t o Form: 
BY THE COURT: 
i'cdL^ KK^HZ^JL 
.John A. Rok ich , 
¥hird District Court Judge 
Marcus G. Theodore, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
By <Sk 3"bertfen E. Ty 
A t t o r n e y f o r Def 
Date 
Date ?&0t £H} 14&S 
8(3 
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 9. Docketing Statement 
(a) Time for Filing. Within 21 days after the notice of appeal or petition for 
review is filed, the appellant, or the petitioner, shall file a docketing statement 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. An original and 7 copies shall be filed, 
together with proof of service. 
(b) Purpose of Docketing Statement The docketing statement is not a brief 
and should not contain arguments or procedural motions. It it to be used by the 
Court in classifying cases, making summary disposition, and making calendar 
assignments. 
(c) Content of Docketing Statement The docketing statement shall contain 
the following information in the order set forth below: 
(1) the authority believed to confer jurisdiction on the Court to hear the 
appeal or petition for review, or in the case of an interlocutory appeal, the 
date of the Court order allowing the appeal and the issues which may be 
appealed pursuant to the granting of an interlocutory appeal In 
multi-party or multi-issue cases, particular attention should be paid to 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(2) a concise statement of the nature of the proceeding, e.g., this appeal 
is from a final order of the district court, or this petition is for review of 
an order of an administrative agency; 
(3) the date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed; the date of 
any order respecting a motion pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; and the date the notice of appeal or petition for 
review was filed; 
(4) a concise statement of facts material to a consideration of the ques-
tions presented; / • 
(5) the issues presented by the appeal, expressed in terms and circum-
stances of the case, but without unnecessary detail. The questions should 
not be repetitious. General conclusory statements such as 'the judgment 
of the trial court is not supported by the law or facts" are not acceptable; 
(6) any statutes, rules, or cases believed to be determinative of the 
respective issues stated; 
(7) a reference to all related or prior appeals in the case. If the reference 
is to a prior appeal, the appropriate citation should be given. 
(d) Necessary Attachments. Attached to each copy of the docketing 
statement shall be a copy of the following: 
(1) the judgment or order sought to be reviewed; 
(2) any opinion or findings; and 
(3) the notice of appeal and a copy of any order extending the time for 
the filing of a notice of appeal. 
(e) Consequences of Failure to Comply. Docketing statements which fail to 
comply with this Rule will not be accepted. Failure to comply may result in 
dismissal of the appeal or petition. 
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This Rule is derived from former Rule 73A, 
URCivP and is similar to Rule 8 U.S. Tenth 
Circuit Court with minor changes. The time for 
filing the docketing statement is changed from 
15 days to 21 days after the notice of appeal is 
filed, and the number of copies to be filed was 
increased from 6 to an original and 7. Para-
graph headings also have been added for ease of 
reference. 
The principal objective of this Rule is to 
require counsel for the appellant to immedi-
ately focus upon and frame the issues to be 
addressed in the appeal, and thereby assist the 
Supreme Court in making calendar 
assignments, classifying cases, and ruling on 
summary disposition motions under Rule 10. 
Additionally, docketing statements enhance 
the Court's ability to identify jurisdictional 
defects, monitor pending appeals and to iden-
tify at the initial stages those appeals which 
involve complex and/or multiple issues 
requiring more detailed consideration. 
The content of the docketing statement and 
requisite attachments are set forth in detail in 
paragraphs (c) and (d), irespectively. Paragraph 
(e) is explicit that a failure to comply with this 
Rule may result in dismissal of the appeal. 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 11. The Record on Appeal. 
(a) Composition of the Record on Appeal The original papers and exhibits 
filed in the district court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and the index 
prepared by the clerk of the district court shall constitute the record on appeal 
in all cases. However with respect to papers and exhibits, only those prescribed 
under paragraph (d) of this Rule shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
(b) Pagination and Indexing of the Record. Immediately upon filing of the 
notice of appeal, the clerk of the district court shall prepare an index of all of 
the original papers filed in the district court, and shall paginate those papers 
in chronological order. 
(c) Duty of Appellant After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in 
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with 
the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Rule and shall take any other 
action necessary to enable the clerk to assemble and transmit the record. A 
single record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers and Exhibits on Appeal. 
(1) Criminal Cases. All of the original papers in a criminal case shall be 
included by the clerk of the district court as part of the record on appeal. 
(2) Civil Cases. In all civil cases, the record shall remain in the custody 
of the clerk of the district court, as set forth in Rule 12(b)(2), during 
preparation and filing of briefs. 
The district court clerk shall establish rules and procedures for checking 
out the record, after pagination, for use by the parties in briefing. 
(A) Civil Cases with Short Records. In civil cases where all the 
original papers total fewer than 300 pages, all of the original papers will 
be transmitted to the Supreme Court upon completion of the filing of 
briefs by the parties, as set forth in Rule 12(b)(2). In such cases, the 
appellant shall serve a notice upon the clerk of the district court, simul-
taneous with the filing of appellant's reply brief with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court, of the date in which appellant's reply brief was filed; if 
appellant does not intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the 
clerk of the district court of that fact within 30 days of the filing of 
respondent's brief with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
(B) All Other Civil Cases. In all other civil cases where the original 
papers are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall file with the clerk of the 
district court, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a joint or 
separate designation of those papers referred to in their respective 
briefs. Only those designated papers and the following, to the extent 
applicable, shall be transmitted to the Clerk of the Supreme Court by the 
clerk of the district court: 
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure; 
(ii) the pretrial order, if any; 
(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order from which the 
appeal is taken; 
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any; 
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of law 
filed or delivered by the trial court; 
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(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon 
which the court rendered judgment, if any; 
(vii) jury instructions given, if any; 
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any; 
(ix) the notice of appeal. 
(e) The Transcript of Proceedings; Duty of Appellant to Order: Notice to 
Respondent if Partial Transcript is Ordered. 
(1) Request for Transcript; Time for Filing. Within 10 days after filing 
the notice of appeal the appellant shall request from the reporter a tran-
script of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as he deems 
necessary. The request shall be in writing and within the same period a 
copy shall be filed with the clerk of the district court. If no such parts of 
the proceedings are to be requested, within the same period the appellant 
shall file a certificate to that effect. 
(2) Transcript Required of all Evidence Regarding Challenged Finding 
or Conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, he shall 
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding 
or conclusion. 
(3) Statement of Issues; Cross-Designation by Respondent Unless the 
entire transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days after 
filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues he intends to 
present on the appeal and shall serve on the respondent a copy of the 
request or certificate and of the statement. If the respondent deems a 
transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, he shall, within 
10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the statement of 
the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation of additional 
parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of such designa-
tion the appellant has requested such parts, and has so notified the 
respondent, the respondent may within the following 10 days either 
request the parts or move in the district court for an order requiring the 
appellant to do so. 
(4) Payment of Reporter. At the time of the request, a party shall make 
satisfactory arrangements with the reporter for payment of the cost of the 
transcript. 
(f) Agreed Statement as the Record on Appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal 
as defined in paragraph (a) of this Rule, the parties may prepare and sign a 
statement of the case showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose and 
were decided in the district court and setting forth only so many of the facts 
averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the 
issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such 
additions as the court may consider necessary fully to present the issues raised 
by the appeal, shall be approved by the district court and transmitted by the 
district court clerk to the Clerk of the Supreme Court as the record on appeal 
within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The index shall be transmitted to 
the Supreme Court by the clerk of the district court upon approval by the 
district court of the statement. 
(g) Statement of the Evidence or Proceedings When no Report was Made or 
When the Transcript is Unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings 
at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the appellant 
may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available 
means, including his recollection. The statement shall be served on the 
respondent, who may serve objections or propose amendments thereto within 
10 days after service. Thereupon the statement and any objections or proposed 
amendments shall be submitted to the district court for settlement and 
approval and as settled and approved shall be included by the clerk of the 
district court in the record on appeal. 
(h) Correction or Modification of the Record. If any difference arises as to 
whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the district court, the 
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made 
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the 
record by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties by stipulation, 
or the district court, or the Supreme Court, either before or after the record is 
transmitted to the Supreme Court, on proper suggestion or of its own initiative, 
may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected, and if necessary 
that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving party, or 
the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties a 
statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service any party may 
serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the form and 
content of the record shall be presented to the Supreme Court. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rules 11, 12, and 13 govern the preparation 
and transmission of the record on appeal. They 
involve substantial departures from prior Utah 
practice. Rules 10, 11, and 12 FRAP, were the 
starting point but the final product is largely 
the Committees original work. 
Paragraph (a). This paragraph provides that 
the record on appeal includes all of the original 
papers filed in the district court, the index of 
the papers, and the transcript, if any. No new 
record is to be prepared for the appeal and the 
Supreme Court can rely on any material con-
tained in the district court's original file. 
Paragraph (b). As soon as a notice of appeal 
is filed, the district court clerk is required to 
paginate all of the papers in the file and prepare 
an index of them. Under paragraph (d) of this 
Rule and paragraph (b) of Rule 12, the papers 
and exhibits in civil cases will remain in the 
custody of the district court clerk until after 
briefing is completed. Pagination and indexing 
allows for the orderly handling of papers and 
will take place as to the entire court file, even 
though in cases of 300 or more pages, all the 
papers will not be transmitted to the Supreme 
Court. 
Paragraph (c). Appellant's obligations do not 
cease with the filing of a notice of appeal. Each 
appellant is required to comply with the tran-
script provisions of paragraph (e), and assist the 
clerk, when necessary, to - assemble and 
transmit the record. 
Paragraph (d). This paragraph is a substan-
tial departure from prior practice under Rule 75 
URCivP. 
In criminal cases, and in civil cases with 
records of fewer than 300 pages, all of the 
original papers filed in the district court will be 
transmitted to the Supreme Court at the appro-
priate time. In criminal cases, the appropriate 
time is as soon as the transcript, if any, is com-
pleted and filed with the district court clerk 
under Rule 12(a). If there is no transcript, the 
papers are to be transmitted within 20 days of 
the filing of the notice of appeal. See Rule 
12(bXl). The result is that in criminal cases, the 
original papers and transcript will be in the 
custody of the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
during the briefing period. 
In civil cases where the record is less than 
300 pages, all of the original papers in the file 
will be transmitted to the Supreme Court Clerk 
within 20 days after the appellant has filed his 
reply brief on appeal with the Supreme Court or 
if appellant elects not to file a reply brief; 
within 30 days of the filing of respondent's brief 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. See Rule 
11(d)(2)(A), Rule 12(b)(2). The appellant has an 
obligation under paragraph (a) to notify the 
clerk of the district court, simultaneously with 
the filing of appellant's reply brief, of the date 
in which the reply brief was filed with the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court, or if appellant does not 
file a reply brief, to notify the clerk of the dis-
trict court of that fact within 30 days of the 
filing of respondent's brief in the Supreme 
Court. 
In civil cases with records of 300 pages or 
more, only a portion of the original papers will 
be transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
Transmission of these papers, like transmission 
of the papers in civil cases with short records, 
will occur only after briefing is completed. The 
parties must, after briefing is completed, file 
with the district court clerk a designation of the 
papers referred to in their briefs. The matters 
designated by the parties, along with the 
mandatory items listed in paragraph (dX2XB), 
will then be transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
In all events the transcript stays with the 
original papers and will be transmitted with 
them to the Supreme Court. 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph governs the 
ordering of the transcript of proceedings. It is 
each appellant's responsibility to order such 
portions of the proceedings as are necessary for 
a full consideration of the issues which he 
intends to raise on appeal. If the appellant 
orders a transcript of less than the entire pro-
ceedings he must file and serve on the 
respondent a statement of the issues he intends 
to raise on appeal and a copy of his request for 
a partial transcript. This is to enable the 
respondent to consider whether the partial 
transcript adequately covers the issues which 
are raised by the appellant. If, in the 
respondent's view, the partial transcript is 
insufficient, he may request that the appellant 
include additional portions of the proceedings. 
If the appellant fails to do so, the respondent 
may either move in the district court for an 
order compelling the appellant to do so or the 
respondent may order the additional parts 
himself. 
Paragraph (f). The agreed statement provides 
an alternative to the ordinary procedures for 
preparation and transmittal of the record. If the 
parties choose to use em agreed statement, it 
shall be submitted to the district court for 
approval and, if approved, transmitted to the 
Supreme Court in place of the ordinary record 
after briefing and in accordance with Rule 
12(b)(2). 
Paragraph (g). This paragraph applies 
whenever a transcript of the proceedings is 
unavailable. 
Paragraph (h). This paragraph applies 
whenever there is a question as to whether the 
transcript or the original papers accurately 
reflect what occurred in the district court. 
These disputes should usually be submitted to 
the district court since it will ordinarily be in 
the best position to ascertain the correctness of 
the record. Under unusual circumstances, how-
ever, it may be appropriate for such a dispute to 
be submitted to the Supreme Court, or for the 
district court or the Supreme Court to act on its 
own motion. In any event, all parties shall be 
given notice of proposed changes in the record 
and an opportunity to object to them. 
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Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the Appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order here indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the 
caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The 
list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside 
the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, Court rules, statutes and other authorities 
cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A statement of the issues presented for review. 
(5) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regu-
lations whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim 
with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of provision is lengthy, 
the citation alone will suffice and in that event, the provision shall be set 
forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this Rule. 
(6) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record (see para-
graph (e)). 
(7) Summary of arguments. A summary of arguments, suitably para-
graphed shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made 
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading 
under which the argument is arranged. 
(8) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on. 
(9) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(b) Brief of the Respondent. The brief of the respondent shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this Rule, except that a statement of the 
issues or of the case need not be made unless the respondent is dissatisfied with 
the statement of the appellant. 
(c) Reply Brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
respondent, and if the respondent has cross-appealed, the respondent may file 
a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the 
cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set 
forth in the opposing brief. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of 
Court. 
(d) References in Briefs to Parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such desig-
nations as "appellant" and "respondent." It promotes clarity to use the designa-
tions used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names 
of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the iiyured person," 
"the taxpayer," etc. 
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(e) References in Briefs to the Record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of the 
reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or pro-
ceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). Refer-
ences to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made 
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, and 
received or rejected. 
(f) Reproduction of Statutes, Rules, Regulations, Documents, Etc. If deter-
mination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regu-
lations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not set forth under 
subparagraph (a)(4) of this Rule, they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an 
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the Court in pamphlet form. 
Copies of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to 
the determination of the appeal (e.g., the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the contract or document 
subject to construction, etc.) shall also be included in the addendum. 
(g) Length of Briefs. Except by permission of the Court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (f) of this Rule. 
(h) Briefs in Cases Involving Cross-Appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing his notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this Rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
Court otherwise orders. The brief of the respondent shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in his appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the 
appellant. 
(i) Briefs in Cases Involving Multiple Appellants or Respondents. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or respondent, including cases consolidated 
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant or respondent may adopt by reference any part of the brief of 
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of Supplemental Authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after his brief has been filed, or 
after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the Clerk 
of the Court, by letter, with a copy of all counsel, setting forth the citations. 
There shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued 
orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument 
state the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made 
within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and Sanctions. All briefs under this Rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the Court, and/or the Court may assess attorney's fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
(1) Brief Covers. The covers of all briefs shall comply with Rule 27. Cover 
material shall be heavyweight paper. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This Rule is based on Rule 28 FRAP, with 
certain modifications. It differs significantly 
from prior Rule 75(p)(2) URCivP. 
Inadequate appellate briefs which do not sig-
nificantly assist the Court in disposing of the 
case before it have proven to be a significant 
problem. In order to alleviate this concern, this 
Rule clearly specifies the required contents and 
order of each brief. Under paragraph (k), briefs 
which do not comply with the requirements of 
the rule or are otherwise inadequate may be 
disregarded or stricken by the Court. The Court 
may also assess attorney's fees against the 
non-complying lawyers. 
Paragraph (a)(1). This paragraph requires 
that the brief include a complete list of all 
parties if they are not reflected in the caption of 
the case in order to permit the Court to identify 
and evaluate potential conflicts of interest. 
Paragraph (a)(4). Unlike prior Rule 75(p)(2) 
URCivP., this paragraph expressly requires a 
"statement of the issues" presented for review. 
The requirement is regarded by the Committee 
as particularly important. 
Paragraph (a)(5). This paragraph requires 
that constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances and regulations involved in the case 
be quoted verbatim, unless they are unduly 
lengthy. In that event, they shall be cited and 
included in the addendum provided for by para-
graph (f). 
Paragraph (aXS). This paragraph requires all 
statements of proceedings and facts to be sup-
ported by references to the record. The prior 
rule contained a similar requirement, but was 
frequently disregarded in practice. This rule is 
intended to emphasize that such citations are 
required in all cases. See also paragraph (e). 
Paragraph (aX7). This paragraph requires a 
summary of the argument in all cases. This 
departure from Rule 24 FRAP was made 
because such summaries were found to be of 
substantial assistance to the Court. 
Paragraph tf).*The provision for an adden-
dum has no counterpart in prior practice. 
Paragraph (g). The limit of 50 pages for the 
opening brief of appellant and respondent's 
answering brief is the same as under prior Utah 
practice, Rule 75(p)(2) URCivP. The 25-page 
limit on reply briefs differs from prior Utah 
practice and coincides with the page limitation 
under Rule 28(g) FRAP. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 8. General Rules of Pleadings. 
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether 
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain 
(l)a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be 
demanded. 
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon 
which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and 
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the 
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or 
a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and 
material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good 
faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make 
his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he 
may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or 
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert 
all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set 
forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance of affirma-
tive defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counter-
claim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, 
shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading 
to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alterna-
tive and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal 
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject 
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(0 Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 9. Pleading Special Matters. 
(a) (1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or 
be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative 
capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that 
is made a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal 
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the 
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall 
do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such supporting 
particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge, and on such 
issue the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall 
establish the same on the trial. 
(2) Designation of Unknown Defendant When a party does not know 
the name of an adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and 
thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any pleading or pro-
ceeding by any name; provided, that when the true name of such adverse 
party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accord-
ingly. 
(3) Actions to Quiet Title; Description of Interest of Unknown Parties. 
In an action to quiet title wherein any of the parties are designated in the 
caption as "unknown," the pleadings may describe such unknown persons 
as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest 
in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the 
complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto." 
(b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all averments of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a 
person may be averred generally. 
(c) Conditions Precedent In pleading the performance or occurrence of 
conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions prece-
dent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or 
occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when so made 
the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial establish 
the facts showing such performance or occurrence. 
(d) Official Document or Act. In pleading an official document or act it is 
sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance 
with law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign 
court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient 
to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdic-
tion to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with 
particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or decision 
shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts. 
(f) Time and Place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, 
averments of time and place are material and shall be considered like all other 
averments of material matter. 
(g) Special Damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall 
be specifically stated. 
(h) Statute of Limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not 
necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally 
that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, 
referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by section 
number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision 
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relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted, 
the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing 
that the cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private Statutes; Ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, 
or an ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from 
such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance 
by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or other designa-
tion in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances. The court shall 
thereupon take judicial notice thereof. 
(j) Libel and Slander. 
(1) Pleading Defamatory Matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel 
or slander to set forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the 
plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the action arose; but it is 
sufficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken con-
cerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party alleging 
such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so 
published or spoken. 
(2) Pleading Defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the 
defendant may allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory 
and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, 
whether he proves the justification or not. he may give in evidp^ft the 
mitigating circumstances. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 12. Defenses and Objections. 
* * * * 
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or feet, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: 
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to 
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may 
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a 
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading 
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as 
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
* * * * 
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